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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-ARTICLE I, SECTION 27 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION-ACQUISITION OF PUBLIC PARKLAND-The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has held that the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania can take land set aside as a public common and use it to
improve a public highway without violating the constitutional duty
to conserve and maintain public natural resources for the benefit of
all.
Payne v. Kassab, 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976).
In 1971, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penn
DOT) proposed widening a main street in the city of Wilkes-Barre.,
Local residents filed suit in equity seeking to enjoin the common-
wealth, acting through Penn DOT, from exercising its power of emi-
nent domain to take land from a public park known as the River
Common for use in widening the road.' The Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court, sitting en banc, dismissed the suit. In its view, the
residents had failed to show that the environmental harm to the
common greatly outweighed the public benefit to accrue from the
street-widening project. 3
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the residents
challenged the legality of the project on three grounds. They alleged
that taking land from the common for use as a road would violate
the Pennsylvania legislature's statutory dedication of the park,4
1. See Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 17, 312 A.2d 86, 88 (1973), aff'd en banc
14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 491, 323 A.2d 407 (1974), aff'd 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976). Two
plans were initially considered. One called for the taking of land from both sides of River
Street; the other, eventually accepted, required all land to be taken from the common. Penn
DOT adopted the latter plan since acquisition costs would be lower and less revenue would
be lost from the local tax base. Penn DOT also concluded that the adopted plan would better
suit the needs of the local community and was generally more feasible. Payne v. Kassab, 468
Pa. 226, 232, 361 A.2d 263, 266 (1976).
2. The common presently consists of approximately 32 acres. Of this, approximately 11
acres are utilized for the county courthouse, railroad tracks, and various streets. The remain-
ing 21 acres, from which the required one-half acre was acquired, are used for a park and
recreation area. 468 Pa. at 229-30, 361 A.2d at 264.
3. Payne v. Kassab, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 491, 323 A.2d 407 (1974), aff'd 468 Pa. 226, 361
A.2d 263 (1976).
4. The River Common came into being as the result of the joining of two parcels of land
dedicated by the Pennsylvania legislature, the last of which was dedicated in 1846. At the
time of the statutory dedication, River Street was within the area dedicated "as a public
common, and to remain as such forever," and was used as a street. See 11 Pa. Commw. Ct.
at 20, 312 A.2d at 90.
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that Penn DOT had not complied with the provisions of Act 120
which controlled how and when the department could acquire park-
land for highway construction, and that the proposed use would
constitute a breach of the trust created by article 1, section 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution,' which requires the commonwealth to
conserve its public natural resources for the benefit of all the people.
In a 5-1 decision,7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
commonwealth court's order dismissing the petition. Justice Pome-
roy wrote for the majority and noted that while the land was dedi-
cated specifially for use as a common, River Street was in use as a
roadway at the time of the dedication. The court examined the
legislative grants creating the common and found no intent to pre-
clude expansion of a street which had existed at that time.8 While
conceding that restrictions in statutory grants are to be strictly
construed,9 the court stated that dedicated land could be diverted
from one public use to another in a proper case, especially when
the land was being used for the alternative public purpose at the
time of the restrictive grant."° In answer to the residents' claim that
Penn DOT had acted in a manner inconsistent with the terms of Act
5. The section of the Administrative Code commonly known as "Act 120" provides in
part:
No highway . . . shall be built or expanded in such a way as to use any land from
any recreation area . . . historic site . . . or public park unless: (i) there is no feasible
and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (ii) such corridor . . . is planned
and constructed so as to minimize harm to such recreation area . . . or public park.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 512(a)(15) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See id. § 512(b), which
enumerates the factors to be considered in determining whether an area such as the River
Common can properly be converted to use as a highway..See also 468 Pa. at 240-41 n.15, 361
A.2d at 270 n.15.
6. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides in part:
The people have a right to clean tiir, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet
to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 [hereinafter referred to as section 27].
7. Justice Pomeroy was joined by Justices Manderino, O'Brien, and Nix. Justice Eagen
concurred in the result.
8. 468 Pa. at 239, 361 A.2d at 269.
9. See Bernstein v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 200, 77 A.2d 452 (1951) (city permitted to use, as
place to present light opera, park dedicated for "attractive and healthful resort, and open
air recreation"). See also Shields v. Philadelphia, 405 Pa. 600, 176 A.2d 697 (1962) (permissi-
ble to construct little league field and team buildings on land dedicated "on condition no
buildings shall be erected thereon other than those required for the comfort of the people").
10. 468 Pa. at 238, 361 A.2d at 269. See note 9 supra.
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120, Justice Pomeroy observed that the act requires Penn DOT, in
determining which of the proposed plans to approve, to enlist the
affected local political entity to assist in the formulation and devel-
opment of a feasible plan, the consideration of alternative plans,
and a balancing of the factors set forth in the statute." Penn DOT,
in adopting the challenged plan, complied with the provisions of the
statute and therefore, in the court's view, had not acted unlaw-
fully. , ,
Addressing the residents' assertion that the proposed use would
constitute a breach of the constitutional trust imposed on the com-
monwealth by section 27,' 3 Justice Pomeroy admitted that the pro-
ject, as approved by Penn DOT, would infringe upon the public
resources protected by the amendment. 4 Clear proof of harm to
section 27 rights was not, however, in and of itself a breach of the
trust created by the constitutional provision." Declaring that the
amendment did not create an "automatic right to recovery,"'" the
court noted that the duty to preserve natural resources had to be
balanced with the other duties imposed upon the commonwealth for
the benefit of the public, such as providing adequate public high-
11. 468 Pa. at 239-41, 361 A.2d at 269-70.
12. Id. at 244, 361 A.2d at 272.
13. See note 6 supra for the text of § 27.
14. This concession required the court to consider the propriety of the commonwealth's
intentional damage to the scenic, historic, and esthetic values protected by § 27. In the first
case involving § 27 to reach the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the court found that the
petitioner, the commonwealth, had failed to establish that the challenged conduct would
injure the constitutionally protected environmental rights. The commonwealth had not
shown by clear and convincing evidence that such harm would result. See Commonwealth v.
Nat'l Gettysburg Battle Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
15. The court specifically reserved comment on whether § 27 is self-executing and can be
used by the commonwealth in its capacity as trustee, as authority for enjoining an otherwise
lawful use of private property by a private entity. 468 Pa. at 245, 361 A.2d at 272. In Common-
wealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battle Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973), the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the commonwealth, as plaintiff, had failed to demonstrate
that a particular project, the construction of an observation tower on private land, would
violate the environmental rights amendment. The justices differed as to the need for imple-
menting legislation to allow the trustee, should the harm be proven, to enjoin the otherwise
lawful use of private land as impermissibly injuring the values protected by § 27. Justices
O'Brien and Pomeroy argued on due process and equal protection grounds that implementing
legislation was required. Id. at 203, 311 A.2d at 593. Chief Justice Jones and Justice Eagen
concluded that § 27 was self-executing; the amendment was sufficient, in and of itself, to
allow the trustee to proceed to protect the public resources. Id. at 208-10, 311 A.2d at 596-97
(Jones, C.J., dissenting). Justices Roberts, Nix, and Manderino concurred in the result but
did not comment on this issue.
16. 468 Pa. at 246, 361 A.2d at 273.
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ways. 7 The commonwealth, although charged with the public
trust"8 and required to conserve the resources constituting the trust
res, could permit the consumption of the trust resources as long as
the use was carried out in a controlled and well-planned manner
reflective of the importance placed upon the values enumerated in
the environmental rights amendment. 9
Justice Pomeroy recognized the difficulty in balancing the com-
peting interests of environmental and socioeconomic concerns." He
viewed Act 120 as reflecting the high priority of section 27 values
while affording a procedure for the sacrifice of the public natural
resources under the proper circumstances.2 As a result, adherence
to the provisions of the Act was in and of itself conservation within
the mandate of section 27. The court did not expressly adopt the
commonwealth court's threefold standard of judicial review for as-
saying the legality of conduct injurious to public natural resources,
but, in the court's view, satisfying that test was the functional
equivalent of adherence to Act 120.2 Under the commonwealth
17. Id. at 246-47, 361 A.2d at 273. The court apparently reasoned that the General Assem-
bly did not intend § 27 to require an absolute maintenance of the status quo; virtually any
change in an area such as the common would, to some extent, impair the scenic or historic
qualities of the area.
18. Id. at 246, 361 A.2d at 273. The imposition of the public trust requires the common-
wealth to act in a fiduciary capacity. It can gauge its success in conserving the public natural
resources only by measuring the benefits its citizens have received from their use of the trust
res. See Broughton, The Proposed Pennsylvania Declaration of Environmental Rights, Analy-
sis of HB 958, 41 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 421, 423 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Broughton]. See also
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
19. The court's interpretation of § 27 is consistent with the intent of the legislature in
drafting the provision. The original draft charged the commonwealth with the duty to
"preserve" the scenic, historic and esthetic qualities of public natural resources. Dr. Goddard,
then Secretary of Forests and Waters, proposed that "preserve" be changed to "conserve" to
preclude the amendment from being interpreted in such a manner that intelligent manage-
ment of the commonwealth's resources could not take place. See Broughton, supra note 18,
at 424. The drafters of the amendment adopted Dr. Goddard's suggestion. See note 6 supra.
See also Flowers v. Northhampton Bucks County Mun. Auth., 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 88, 57
Pa. D.&C.2d 279 (1972), where the court interpreted the constitutional amendment as
making environmental rights one factor to be considered, along with other relevant considera-
tions, to insure the desired controlled development of land within the commonwealth.
20. 468 Pa. at 246, 361 A.2d at 273. The Pennsylvania courts have, on occasion, expressed
doubt whether they are the appropriate forum for consideration of this difficult problem. See
Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battle Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 231, 249, 302 A.2d
886, 895 (1973) (acknowledging that other arms of the commonwealth might be better suited
for the establishment of environmental management standards).
21. 468 Pa. at 246, 361 A.2d at 273. See note 5 supra for the relevant text of the act.
22. 468 Pa. at 247 n.23, 361 A.2d at 273 n.23.
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court's standard, the commonwealth must observe all applicable
environmental legislation, insure that reasonable steps are taken to
minimize harm to the constitutionally designated values, and be
satisfied that the harm to the trust res will not clearly outweigh the
benefits which will inure to society as a result of the project.2 Hav-
ing determined that Penn DOT had complied with Act 120, and
therefore had complied with the commonwealth court's standard, 4
the court found that the commonwealth, acting through Penn DOT,
was not in breach of its fiduciary duties when it acquired the addi-
tional land from the River Common for use as a road.
Justice Roberts dissented from the majority's finding that widen-
ing River Road was a permissible use within the terms of the com-
mon's dedication and also from its conclusion that Penn DOT had
abided by the requirements of Act 120.5 He reasoned that using
land from the common as a road was in contravention of the statu-
tory grant, since the dedication limited the land to use solely as a
public common. In addition, he summarily concluded that Penn
DOT had not sustained its burden of demonstrating that there ex-
isted no reasonable and prudent alternative to taking land from the
common for use in the street-widening project."
Act 120, enacted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1970,
was the product of a comprehensive legislative program designed to
insure that the values recognized in article I, section 27-natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values-would be accorded proper pro-
tection.27 The Act seeks to assure conservation by requiring Penn
DOT to plan, construct, and maintain highways in a manner that
safeguards the values encompassed within the amendment and that
permits the utilization of protected land for uses injurious to the
natural resources only when no feasible alternative exists and the
23. Id.
24. While arguably the majority did not expressly approve of the three-step Payne stan-
dard, upon close examination it appears the court implicity did so. The court specifically
noted that normal appellate review of conduct within the scope of Act 120 required no more
than would the application of the commonwealth court's Payne standard. Id. Having deter-
mined that adherence to Act 120 in and of itself insured conservation as mandated by § 27,
the majority must have viewed the commonwealth court's test as an adequate standard by
which to insure observance of the environmental trust.
25. Id. at 247-48, 361 A.2d at 273-74 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 248, 361 A.2d at 274. Justice Roberts expressed no view on whether the common-
wealth had breached its fiduciary obligations imposed by § 27.
27. See 468 Pa. at 239-40, 361 A.2d at 269-70.
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public benefits resulting from the proposed use justify the taking."8
In a case such as Payne, where the taking is admittedly insignificant
when compared to the benefits derived by the community from the
project," the three-step standard employed by the commonwealth
court works well, and the decision in Payne arguably does no vio-
lence to the provisions of section 27. However, applying the Payne
standard when reviewing any state conduct affecting the trust res
may not insure that the required conservation will result in future
cases brought under the environmental rights amendment. 0
Act 120 regulates the actions of Penn DOT when the department
contemplates the acquisition of land which falls within the scope of
the trust amendment. But not all decisions affecting public natural
resources are governed by a legislative scheme as solicitous of the
scenic, historical, and environmental values as Act 120.1' Although
the drafters of the environmental amendment intended that protec-
tion of citizens' interest in quality environment be commensurate
with the protection accorded other constitutional rights,32 the con-
28. See note 5 supra.
29. The court noted that the proposed intrusion on the common would be minimal and
the actual harm to the public natural resources would be insignificant when compared to the
project's beneficial impact on the community and Penn DOT's efforts to minimize the harm
to the common. 468 Pa. at 242, 361 A.2d at 271. See also 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 24-27, 312
A.2d at 92-93, where the chancellor set forth his findings on the harm to the common which
would result from the project and the importance of the River Street project to the area.
30. See note 32 and accompanying text infra.
31. One example of legislation not providing the safeguards of Act 120 is the following
statute relating to the eminent domain powers of cities: "[T]he municipal authorities . . .
having jurisdiction in any city of this commonwealth shall have exclusive control and direc-
tion of the opening [and] widening . . . of all streets . . . within the limits of such city, and
may open or widen streets, at such points . . . as may be deemed necessary by such city
authorities .... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1671 (1974). This statute does not require, as does
Act 120, that detailed procedures be followed in determining that land containing natural
resources not be utilized in a manner injurious to those resources. If it were shown that
reasonable attempts were made to at least minimize harm to the environment, Payne would
require that a court not intervene to prevent the resultant harm absent a showing that the
harm clearly outweighed the supposed benefit of the project.
32. The intent of the amendment's framers was to require conservation of the public
natural resources of Pennsylvania. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. While the trust
res could be consumed under the proper circumstances, the citizens' rights in the trust
resources were to be protected and the res preserved by close scrutiny of any project poten-
tially injurious to the recognized environmental rights. The intent of the framers was to
provide an individual's environmental rights in public lands the same status accorded his
civil liberties in the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. The chief legislative
sponsor of § 27 made this clear.
When our original constitutions were drafted in the 18th century the issue was
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servation mandated by section 27 is not assured where a statutory
scheme of protection is lacking. The Payne standard proscribes en-
vironmental intrusion only when the injured party affirmatively
demonstrates that the qualitative harm clearly outweighs the poten-
tial public benefit of the project. Arguably, this does not accord
these scenic, historic, natural, and esthetic values that level of pro-
tection intended by the passage of section 27. The potential for
inadequate protection of environmental resources is heightened by
the fact that local governmental authorities also have jurisdiction
over portions of the protected resources-the trust res. 3  These au-
thorities, often lacking the expertise and resources available to large
state agencies and without the constraints of comprehensive legisla-
tion such as Act 120, ' could act in a manner which would harm
section 27 values. The only limitation on such action would be a
demonstration by a member of the public that the "clearly out-
weighed" test of Payne had been met. Absent such a showing, which
may be a formidable obstacle to an individual or association with
limited resources,35 courts will not intervene to insure that the com-
monwealth fulfils its role as trustee pursuant to section 27 and acts
in a manner which comports with the amendment's directive.
preserving man's political environment, not his natural environment. . . . Because
our political enviroment was imperiled our Constitution makers added Bills of Rights
to our . . . Constitutions . . . . [Tihe future of our natural resources was taken for
granted.
• . . Our political environment is strongly protected by vigilant courts and an alert
press . . . . If we are to save our natural environment we must . . . give it the same
Constitutional protection we give to our political environment.
Statement by Franklin L. Kury, given before the House of Delegates, Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n,
January 1970, reprinted in Broughton, supra note 18, at 422.
33. See Community College v. Fox, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 335, 342 A.2d 468 (1975). In Fox,
residents alleged that the Department of Environmental Resources (DER) had erred in not
weighing the full environmental impact of a sewage project, specifically, that DER had failed
to consider the long-range effects of the project. The commonwealth court noted that while
long-range effects had to be considered to allow for the conservation contemplated by § 27,
each agency or agent of the commonwealth was restricted to exercising only the authority
granted it by the legislature. Id. at 355-56, 342 A.2d at 480-81. In discussing its use of the
term "agent," the court stated that municipal authorities were "not only agents of the
Commonwealth . . . but trustees of the public natural resources as well .... " Id. at 358,
342 A.2d at 482. It is not at all certain, however, whether municipalities are subject to the
same fiduciary duties imposed on the commonwealth by § 27. See note 31 and accompanying
text supra.
34. Compare note 5 and accompanying text supra, with note 31 supra.
35. Cf. Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct.
231, 302 A.2d 886, aff'd, 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
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To insure that the public natural resources are conserved as sec-
tion 27 contemplates, a standard of judicial review more cognizant
of conservation is probably required. One possible standard more
reflective of the legislative intent of the amendment, yet one which
would maintain an awareness of the need for a balancing of the
competing economic and esthetic interests at stake, would require
the commonwealth, with its admittedly superior resources and easy
access to the pertinent information, to have the burden of proof in
claims alleging violation of the trust created by section 27. This
burden would require the commonwealth, as trustee, to demon-
strate that the benefits to the public from the proposed project in
fact outweigh the resulting harm to the protected resources." An-
other possible standard of review, fully equating the public's envi-
ronmental rights with the civil liberties recognized by the Pennsyl-
vania and United States Constitutions," would permit a proposed
project, potentially injurious to the trust res, to proceed only when
the commonwealth could demonstrate that a court's refusal to allow
an endeavor to continue would amount to an abuse of discretion. To
give substance to this proposal, the environmental values would
take precedence over the competing economic interests in a close
case. Neither of these suggested standards, however, would preclude
consumption of the trust res; both would permit a use injurious to
the protected natural resources when the taking's return to the com-
munity justified the destruction of part of the scenic, historic, natu-
ral, or esthetic value of a public area.
The Payne standard for reviewing claims arising under the envi-
ronmental rights amendment derived from a case in which minimal
harm would result to these recognized public rights and much pub-
lic benefit accrued from the project. The standard articulated by the
commonwealth court and approved by the supreme court was not
truly tested by the factual situation in Payne." Should a case arise
in which the value of a project's public benefits and the value of the
public natural resources required to be consumed by the project are
36. See Pearson & Hutton, Land Use in Pennsylvania; Any Change Since the Environ-
mental Rights Amendment?, 14 DuQ. L. Ray. 165, 196 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Pearson
& Hutton], where the authors imply that such a standard might be more satisfactory than
the Payne test.
37. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
38. The Payne court noted that when the project was finished, the park would remain
essentially unaltered. 468 Pa. at 239, 361 A.2d at 269.
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arguably equal, Payne will not afford an adequate framework for
adjudicating the case in a manner consistent with the conservation
contemplated by section 27.11 Should the Payne formulation remain
the standard for judicial scrutiny of programs which admittedly
injure and consume the trust res, the specter arises of Pennsylvania
courts' affording inadequate protection to constitutionally recog-
nized environmental rights in cases where a statutory scheme as
comprehensive as Act 120 may be inapplicable.
James Richard Walsh
39. All reported cases implementing the Payne standard have resulted in a decision per-
mitting consumption of the trust res. See Pearson & Hutton, supra note 36, at 216 and cases
cited therein.

